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1 INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty and interdependence are two fundamental features of financial systems. While
uncertainty1 over the future value of assets is traditionally very central in the financial literature (Black
& Cox, 1976; Duffie & Singleton, 1999; Leland & Toft, 1996; Lando, 2009; Merton, 1974), interde-
pendence of financial claims’ values, especially in the increasingly interconnected financial system, has
been investigated only more recently (Allen & Gale, 2001; Freixas, Parigi, & Rochet, 2000; Gray, Mer-
ton, & Bodie, 2010; Rochet & Tirole, 1996), taking center stage mostly after the 2008 financial crisis
(Allen & Carletti, 2013; Amini, Cont, & Minca, 2016a; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, & Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015;
Battiston, Caldarelli, May, Roukny, & Stiglitz, 2016b; Bardoscia, Battiston, Caccioli, & Caldarelli,
2017; Elliott, Golub, & Jackson, 2014; Glasserman & Young, 2015; Lewandowska, 2015; Stiglitz,
2010).
The combined presence of both uncertainty and interdependence is the most relevant situation in
practice, and yet the valuation of assets in this case remains an open problem in financial economics.
Indeed, in their daily business, financial institutions need to assign an economic value to the claims they
hold on their counterparties. For example, whether the counterparties will actually pay their obligations
at maturity will depend on the counterparties’ financial situation at maturity, which is known by other
institutions only with some uncertainty, for instance, because of exogenous changes in the value of
their loans to the real sector. The obligations of, say, institution A are assets for A’s creditors. If more
information becomes available on A, its creditors mark to market those assets, incorporating such
information in the valuation of their own balance sheets. As more information is now available on A’s
creditors, the creditors of A’s creditors will in turn update the valuation of their own assets, and so on.
Neglecting either interconnectedness or uncertainty may lead to misestimation of systemic risk. On
the one hand, not accounting for interconnectedness amounts to considering only direct exposures,
ignoring potential indirect exposures to counteparties of counterparties, and so on. This, in turn, may
be reflected in the overvaluation of counterparties’ obligations and in incentives for excessive risk
taking. On the other hand, neglecting uncertainty implies to consider that losses cannot materialize
before the maturity. In contrast, according to the Bank for International Settlements, the largest part of
losses suffered by financial institutions during the financial crisis was not due to actual counterparties’
defaults, but to the mark-to-market reevaluation of obligations following the deterioration of counter-
parties’ creditworthiness.2 The case of AIG in 2008 illustrates the distinction between the propagation
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of realized losses and “mark-to-market” losses, whereby the deterioration of institutions creditworthi-
ness can spread through the network well before the maturity of the contracts (Glasserman & Young,
2016).
Our main contribution is to introduce a framework to perform asset valuation taking into account
both the interdependence of balance sheets connected by a network of so-called interbank assets and
the uncertainty on future values of banks’ external (i.e., noninterbank) assets. The framework abstracts
away from the details of how the valuation is performed. Such details are encapsulated into valua-
tion functions. Once valuation functions are chosen, the framework reduces to a specific model. The
framework includes two families of models. If the valuation is performed strictly before the maturity
of interbank claims, we have a proper model for ex ante valuation. If the valuation is performed at
the maturity, the model describes the clearing of interbank claims. Here we provide general results
that apply to all models compatible with the framework. In particular, we cast the problem into a set of
fixed-point equations for the valuation of institutions’ equities. We prove the existence of a solution that
is optimal for all institutions, and we provide a simple algorithm to compute it with arbitrary precision.
Our second contribution is to show that, by suitably choosing the valuation functions, our framework
recovers several models of clearing (Eisenberg & Noe, 2001; Rogers & Veraart, 2013) and ex ante
valuation (Bardoscia, Battiston, Caccioli, & Caldarelli, 2015; Furfine, 2003) previously introduced in
the literature.
Finally, through our framework we establish a specific connection between clearing models and ex
ante valuation models. In particular, we start from the model introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001)
(EN) and we show that, by averaging its equations over the ex ante uncertainty, we obtain an ex ante
valuation model in the sense implied by our framework. From this point of view, the ex ante valuation
model can be seen as a forward-looking extension of the corresponding clearing model.
Our work is related to several strands of literature. First, adjusting the value of a contract between
two counterparties to account for the risk that they might default is typically referred to in the literature
as credit valuation adjustment (CVA) (see, e.g., Bielecki & Rutkowski, 2013; Sorensen & Bollier,
1994). In its most basic form, CVA is computed by one institution as the risk-neutral expectation of
the losses that it would incur if its counterparty were to default. In practice, in order to compute such
expectation, one typically assumes a specific exogenous stochastic process for the probability of default
of the counterparty. Moreover, as pointed out in Banerjee and Feinstein (2018), CVA only captures
adjustments due to potential defaults of direct counterparties, but not of indirect counterparties. In
contrast, in our framework probabilities of default are computed endogenously (see Section 5) and
account for the creditworthiness of both direct and indirect counterparties.3
Second, because our framework includes clearing models, it is naturally related to the literature on
the clearing of payments between institutions with mutual obligations. The most widely used model for
clearing payments is the EN model, which has been extended to the case of nonzero bankruptcy costs
by Rogers and Veraart (2013) (RV), cross-holdings of equities (Suzuki, 2002), an arbitrary seniority
structure of claims (Fischer, 2014), and time-varying balance sheets (Banerjee, Bernstein, & Feinstein,
2018). Both EN and RV can be explicitly recovered from our framework. Early attempts to establish
network valuation models can be traced back to the work of Furfine (2003), who introduces a model for
cascades of defaults where the value of an interbank asset is equal to its face value as long as the debtor
has not defaulted, and it is equal to zero otherwise. Also the Furfine model can be explicitly recovered
from our framework. In models of cascades of defaults, the deterioration of credit worthiness of an
institution does not have any consequence for its creditors as long as that institution does not default.
To overcome this limitation, a simple mechanism, the so-called DebtRank, has been introduced in
Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca, and Caldarelli (2012), Bardoscia et al. (2015), Battiston, Caldarelli,
D’Errico, and Gurciullo (2016a), based on the assumption that relative shocks to equities of debtors are
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linearly transmitted to interbank assets of creditors. Further extensions generalize the model to non-
linear transmission mechanisms (Bardoscia, Caccioli, Caldarelli, Perotti, & Vivaldo, 2016; Bardoscia
et al., 2017). DebtRank can also be explicitly recovered from our framework. All the aforementioned
models are models of direct contagion, where shocks are propagated via direct exposures. We note
that propagation of shocks in absence of defaults can occur because of indirect contagion, for instance,
in the case of overlapping portfolios and fire-sales (Amini, Filipović, & Minca, 2016b; Cifuentes,
Ferrucci, & Shin, 2005; Caccioli, Shrestha, Moore, & Farmer, 2014; Cont & Schaanning, 2017; Fein-
stein, 2017).
Recently, Veraart (2020) has followed an approach similar to ours, but in which the valuation mech-
anism is introduced as an assumption. In contrast, here, and similarly to Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer
(2006a,2006b), Fischer (2014), the valuation mechanism is derived from a clearing mechanism. In
Elsinger et al. (2006a, 2006b), Fischer (2014), the valuation can be performed only by an agent who
has complete knowledge of all institutions’ interbank assets. Similar setups are presented in Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Hugonnier (2004) and Cossin and Schellhorn (2007). However, in practice,
interbank assets encode financial exposures between institutions and are therefore confidential. Often,
even regulators have only a partial view of the detailed structure of interbank assets. Indeed, a sepa-
rate strand of literature is focused specifically on trying to “reconstruct” interbank assets from publicly
available information (Anand, Craig, & Von Peter, 2015; Cimini, Squartini, Garlaschelli, & Gabrielli,
2015; Gandy & Veraart, 2016; Squartini, Cimini, Gabrielli, & Garlaschelli, 2017; Squartini, Caldarelli,
Cimini, Gabrielli, & Garlaschelli, 2018) or to assess the impact of their misestimation (Feinstein et al.,
2018).
In line with the above consideration, in our framework institutions are assumed to need only knowl-
edge of their own interbank assets, while the valuation is performed collectively by all institutions.
The basic idea is that each institution performs a valuation of its interbank assets, which is reflected
in the value of its equity. Counterparties that hold claims towards this institution, in turn, update the
valuation of their own interbank assets, which is eventually reflected in the value of their own equities.
Our paper provides a characterization of the solutions to this valuation process.
2 FRAMEWORK
We consider a financial system consisting of 𝑛 institutions (for brevity “banks” hereafter) engaging in
credit contracts with each other. These contracts mature at time 𝑇 , while banks perform a valuation
of their assets at time 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 . At time 𝑡, we denote with 𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑡) the book value of the liability of bank 𝑖
towards bank 𝑗 and with𝐴𝑗𝑖(𝑡) the book value of the corresponding asset of bank 𝑗, with𝐴𝑗𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
for consistency. We refer to these quantities as interbank assets and liabilities.
We point out that, in general, book values of interbank assets and liabilities can depend on time, but
they are deterministic and, crucially, do not incorporate any information about the creditworthiness of
counterparties. In this respect, one could think of 𝐴𝑗𝑖(𝑇 ) as the amount that 𝑗 is expected to recover
from 𝑖 at maturity, if 𝑖 is not in default. Similarly, if no additional contracts are stipulated between bank
𝑖 and 𝑗 in the period from 𝑡 to 𝑇 , one could think of𝐴𝑗𝑖(𝑡) as the discounted value of𝐴𝑗𝑖(𝑇 ). Banks also
have external, that is, noninterbank, assets, and liabilities. For example, external assets include loans to
the real sector, while external liabilities include deposits. At time 𝑡, we denote with𝐴𝑒
𝑖
(𝑡) the book value
of external assets of bank 𝑖 and with 𝐿𝑒
𝑖
(𝑡) the book value of its external liabilities. External liabilities
are deterministic, while external assets follow a stochastic process. Each bank observes its external
assets at the valuation time 𝑡, but they are in general unknown at any time between 𝑡 (excluded) and
the maturity 𝑇 (included, unless 𝑡 = 𝑇 ).4 Finally, we denote with 𝑀𝑖(𝑡) the book value of the equity
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At time 𝑡, banks perform a valuation of their own interbank assets. For, say, bank 𝑖, the purpose of
such valuation is to incorporate any information about the creditworthiness of 𝑖’s debtors into the value
of 𝑖’s interbank assets. The valuation will depend in principle on the information available to 𝑖. Without
loss of generality, we write the valuation of interbank assets in the following way:
𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝑡)𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐎𝑖(𝑡)), (2)
where 𝐎𝑖(𝑡) is the information, that is the list of variables and parameters used by 𝑖 to perform the
valuation of interbank assets at time 𝑡. We call 𝕍𝑖𝑗 interbank valuation function, which, at this stage, is
simply the ratio between the valuation of the interbank asset and its book value. Because the purpose
of 𝑖’s interbank valuation function is to account for the creditworthiness of 𝑖’s debtors, we can expect
that 𝐎𝑖(𝑡) includes information on them. The precise list of variables and parameters part of 𝐎𝑖(𝑡) will
depend on the specific valuation model, but in all cases those are deterministic, precisely because they
are observed by 𝑖 at time 𝑡. Also, we note that in general the functional form of 𝕍𝑖𝑗 depends explicitly
on both 𝑖 and 𝑗. This reflects the fact that different banks could use different models to perform the
valuation of their interbank assets and also that one bank could use different models to perform the
valuation of different interbank assets.










(𝑡) is the information, that is the list of variables and parameters used by 𝑖 to perform
the valuation of external assets at time 𝑡 and we call 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
, that is the ratio between the valuation of
external assets and their book value, external valuation function. The external valuation function can
be used, for example, to account for the loss implied by the fire sale of external assets. Let us imagine
that banks were to target a certain leverage ratio and that, whenever they were to deviate from their
target, they would deleverage by selling external assets below market price (a similar mechanism is
described in Battiston et al., 2016a; Cont & Schaanning, 2017; Greenwood, Landier, & Thesmar, 2015).
The external valuation function would then be interpreted as the discount at which external assets were
sold. Such discount factor would depend both on bank 𝑖’s leverage and on other quantities, for example,
the market price and liquidity of its external assets, which would be part of 𝐎𝑒
𝑖
(𝑡). Also in this case, the
precise list of variables and parameters part of 𝐎𝑒
𝑖
(𝑡) will depend on the specific valuation model, but
analogously to 𝐎𝑖(𝑡) those are deterministic.
Banks do not perform a valuation of their liabilities. The rationale of this assumption is that banks are
not allowed to discount their liabilities based on their own creditworthiness or on the creditworthiness
of their creditors. This is consistent with expecting that creditors will try to recover the full value of
their claims towards their debtors. By replacing book values of assets with their valuations in (1), we
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We assume that, for all banks, the total book value of interbank assets and liabilities5 as well as the
book value of external assets and liabilities at time 𝑡 are public information. For example, at each quarter
𝑡, those values could be taken from banks’ financial accounts. However, individual values of interbank
assets (and therefore of interbank liabilities) are not public and are known only by the two participating
counterparties. In our framework this is indeed the only piece of private information. We assume that
equities as well, which incorporate the asset valuations, are also part of the public information. This
would happen, for example, if banks communicated their equity valuations to their counterparties. In





(𝑡)) and 𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐄(𝑡)|𝐎′𝑖(𝑡)), where 𝐎𝑒′𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝐎′𝑖(𝑡) are the lists of variables and parameters
used by 𝑖 at time 𝑡 to perform the valuation of, respectively, external and interbank assets, in addition to
equities. Formally, 𝐎𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐎
′
𝑖






















The third term on the right-hand side of (5) accounts for the valuation of 𝑖’s interbank assets towards its
direct counterparties. However, by solving (5) jointly for all 𝑖, we account not only for the effect of direct
counterparties but also for genuine network effects arising from counterparties of counterparties and
so on. In fact, the analogous of (5) for 𝑖’s counterparties includes the valuation of their interbank assets
towards their own direct counterparties, which are indirect counterparties for 𝑖. Hence, the joint solution
of (5) for all 𝑖 effectively accounts for the valuations of interbank assets of all indirect counterparties.
When 𝑡 < 𝑇 , banks perform a proper ex ante valuation. External assets follow a stochastic process
and therefore that their (book) value at maturity is unknown at time 𝑡. In turn, this generates uncertainty
on banks’ solvency at maturity. Intuitively, the valuation of interbank assets (via valuation functions)
incorporates creditors’ estimate of the likelihood that their debtors will be able to meet their obligations
at maturity, given this source of uncertainty. Equation (5) is also valid when 𝑡 = 𝑇 , that is if banks
perform their valuation at maturity. In this case, there is no uncertainty on the (book) value of external
assets. Nevertheless, creditors are still not fully certain about the value of their interbank assets, until
they actually receive payments from their debtors. Whether their direct debtors are able to deliver such
payments could depend on whether the debtors of their debtors are able to deliver payments. In this
case, our framework is consistent with a setting in which the valuation happens when payments are
due, but before they are delivered. Interbank valuation functions then incorporate creditors’ estimate
of the likelihood that their debtors will deliver their payments. In this sense, the joint solution of (5)
amounts to clearing payments between banks.
In this section, we will introduce a precise definition of valuation function that will allow us to
prove general results that hold regardless of their specific functional form. Those results, derived in
Section 3, will not rely on any further assumption. In Section 5, we will derive a specific set of valuation
functions and we will discuss its economic meaning in detail. As anticipated, the information used by
banks to perform the valuation depends on the specific valuation model. For example, for the interbank
valuation functions derived in Section 5, 𝐎′
𝑖
(𝑡) will include external assets of 𝑖’s counterparties at time
𝑡, their volatilities, and distance to maturity 𝑇 − 𝑡.
In principle, a valuation function can depend on the equities of all banks, but in almost all the exam-
ples that we will make their dependence on equities will be much simpler. Because external assets, by
definition, are independent of any specific counterparty, in most cases external valuation functions will
depend only on the equity of the bank performing the valuation, that is (3) will read 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑡)|𝐎𝑒′𝑖 (𝑡)).
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Analogously, because interbank valuation functions are meant to capture the credit risk of interbank
assets, interbank valuation functions will depend only on the equity of the debtor, that is (2) will read
𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)|𝐎′𝑖(𝑡)). Nevertheless, the results that we prove in Section 3 apply to the more general case in
which valuation functions depend on the equities of any subset of banks. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 2.1. Given an integer 𝑞 ≤ 𝑛, a function 𝕍 ∶ ℝ𝑞 → [0, 1] is called a feasible valuation func-
tion if and only if:
1. it is nondecreasing: 𝐄 ≤ 𝐄′ ⇒ 𝕍 (𝐄) ≤ 𝕍 (𝐄′),∀𝐄,𝐄′ ∈ ℝ𝑞
2. it is continuous from above.
The first observation is that a feasible valuation function takes values between zero and one. This,
combined with (2) and (3), corresponds to assuming that both interbank and external assets cannot
be valued at more than their book value. This is obvious for interbank assets, which represent credit
contracts, as the creditor cannot expect to recover more than the book value of the contract. As already
mentioned, the external valuation function will allow us to model bankruptcy costs due to fire sales.
From this point of view, this assumption is consistent with the fact that a bank cannot expect to profit
from selling illiquid assets.
The second observation is that a feasible valuation function is nondecreasing. For interbank assets,
this corresponds to assuming that credit contracts are nonspeculative, in the sense that the valuation of
interbank assets of one bank cannot increase because the equity of another bank, for example, of one of
its debtors, has decreased.6 We have already mentioned that in all cases considered in Sections 4 and 5
interbank valuation functions depend only on the equity of the debtor. In those specific cases, we have
also that lim𝐸𝑗 (𝑡)→+∞ 𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)|𝐎′𝑖(𝑡)) = 1. This simply means that, when the equity of bank 𝑗 is very
large, bank 𝑖 will deem bank 𝑗 so creditworthy that the corresponding interbank asset is taken at book
value. However, this property is not explicitly required by Definition 2.1 and indeed it is not necessary
for the results in Section 3. In this case, one could interpret the expression 𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝑡)[1 − 𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)|𝐎′𝑖(𝑡))]
as CVA losses. In fact, this is the difference between the book value of 𝑖’s interbank assets towards 𝑗
and its valuation incorporating the information about 𝑗’s creditworthiness. Indeed, it is equal to zero
when the interbank valuation function is equal to one, corresponding to the case in which no CVA
needs to be applied. For external assets this means that their value cannot be boosted by a decrease in
the equity of the bank that holds them (or of any other bank).
The assumption of continuity from above is mainly technical and allows us to deal with the corner
case of discontinuous valuation functions. Indeed, most valuation functions that we will introduce are
continuous (i.e., both from above and from below). A discontinuity of the valuation function corre-
sponds to a finite jump in the valuation of assets following an infinitesimal change in the value of
equities. For example, let us imagine the case in which the interbank valuation function captures the
extremely simplified situation in which creditors take interbank assets at book value as long as their
debtor has positive equity, while they value interbank asset as worthless otherwise. What shall a credi-
tor do when the equity of one of its debtors is exactly equal to zero, that is when assets and liabilities of
that debtor are exactly equal? Continuity from above implies that in this case the creditor should still
take interbank assets at book value.
Since all valuation functions take values in the interval [0, 1], all equities 𝐸𝑖(𝑡) are bounded both







𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑡) ≤ 𝐸𝑖(𝑡) ≤𝑀𝑖(𝑡). (6)
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the set of equations (5) can be rewritten in compact form:
𝐄(𝑡) = Φ(𝐄(𝑡)). (8)
Therefore, performing the valuation reduces to solving the fixed-point equation for 𝐄(𝑡). The valua-
tion functions computed at the fixed point can be interpreted as network-adjusted discount factors. The
usual notion of discount factor captures the fact that the present value of an asset is different from its
future value. Valuation functions account also for both the direct counterparty risk and for the network
effects, which are fully incorporated in the valuations at the fixed point. In order to implement a con-
sistent network-adjusted valuation of interbank claims, it is essential to prove the existence of solutions
of (8).
3 MAIN RESULTS
We now outline the most general results, which apply to generic valuation functions. Proofs are reported
in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of greatest and least solution). If all valuations functions in the map Φ take
values in [0,1] and are nondecreasing, the set of equations (8) admits a greatest solution 𝐄max(𝑡) and
a least solution 𝐄min(𝑡).







(𝑡), for all 𝑖. Within the set of solutions, the greatest solution is the most desir-
able outcome for all banks, as it simultaneously minimizes individual and total losses. In contrast, the
least solution corresponds to the worst case scenario, as it simultaneously maximizes individual and
total losses. Let us explicitly note that every solution 𝐄∗(𝑡) of (8) corresponds to a fixed point of the
iterative map
𝐄(𝑘+1)(𝑡) = Φ(𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡)), (9)
and vice versa. Equation (9) defines the Picard iteration algorithm and in principle provides a method
to compute the solutions with arbitrary precision, as we will show in the following.
Iterating the map starting from an arbitrary 𝐄(0)(𝑡) does not guarantee that the solutions 𝐄max(𝑡) or
𝐄min(𝑡) can be attained. In fact, different solutions of (8) can be found depending on the chosen starting
point. Moreover, some solutions might be unstable, in the sense that, while still satisfying (8), choosing
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a starting point for the Picard iteration algorithm arbitrary close to (but not equal to) such solutions,
may result in the iterative map converging to another solution of (8). The problem of finding the least
and greatest solution this problem is solved by the following two theorems.
Theorem 3.2 (Convergence to the greatest solution). If all valuation functions in the mapΦ are feasible
and if 𝐄(0)(𝑡) = 𝐌(𝑡), then:
1. the sequence {𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡)} is monotonic nonincreasing: ∀𝑘 ≥ 0, 𝐄(𝑘+1)(𝑡) ≤ 𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡),
2. the sequence {𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡)} is convergent: lim𝑘→∞ 𝐄
(𝑘)(𝑡) = 𝐄∞(𝑡),
3. 𝐄∞(𝑡) is a solution of (8) and furthermore 𝐄∞(𝑡) = 𝐄max(𝑡).
Theorem 3.2 shows that, if the starting point of the iteration is 𝐄(0)(𝑡) = 𝐌(𝑡), which corresponds
to taking all assets at their book value, the iterative map (9) converges to the greatest solution 𝐄max(𝑡).
Theorem 3.2 guarantees that for all 𝜖 > 0, there exists 𝐾(𝜖) such that for all 𝑘 > 𝐾(𝜖) we have that
||𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡) − 𝐄max(𝑡)|| < 𝜖. In other words, once a precision 𝜖 has been chosen, starting from the book
values of equities 𝐌(𝑡), and after a finite number of iterations the Picard algorithm provides equities (9)
that are indistinguishable from the greatest solution, within precision 𝜖. However, 𝐾(𝜖) is not known
a priori, and at every time step it has to be checked whether the desired precision 𝜖 has been attained.
Mutatis mutandis, it is possible to prove that
Theorem 3.3 (Convergence to the least solution). If all valuations functions in the map Φ take values
in [0,1], are nondecreasing, and continuous from below, and if 𝐄(0)(𝑡) = 𝐦(𝑡), then
1. the sequence {𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡)} is monotonic nondecreasing: ∀𝑘 ≥ 0, 𝐄(𝑘+1)(𝑡) ≥ 𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡),
2. the sequence {𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡)} is convergent: lim𝑘→∞ 𝐄
(𝑘)(𝑡) = 𝐄∞(𝑡),
3. 𝐄∞(𝑡) is a solution of (8) and furthermore 𝐄∞(𝑡) = 𝐄min(𝑡).
Analogous considerations to the ones proved after Theorem 3.2 also hold in this case, implying that
Theorem 3.3 provides an intuitive way to compute equities in the worst case scenario. Taken together,
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, provide a simple algorithmic way to check whether the solution of (8) is unique
within numerical precision when valuation functions are continuous (both from above and below).
Let us now put these results in the context of the existing literature. In order to prove the existence
of a solution, Suzuki (2002) and Fischer (2014) exploit the Brouwer–Schauder fixed-point theorem,
which requires payments made by each firm to be a continuous function of the payments made by all
firms. The assumption of continuity does not allow to account for default costs. However, in Suzuki
(2002) and Fischer (2014), the iterative map is not required to be monotonic, allowing to model some
derivatives having a specific functional form. Since the Brouwer–Schauder fixed-point theorem does
not give any information about the structure of the solution space (e.g., the existence of a greatest
and a least solution), it is important to have a unique solution.7 In order to prove uniqueness, Suzuki
(2002) and Fischer (2014) resort to the additional hypothesis that the ownership matrix (the analo-
gous of our matrix of interbank assets) is strictly left substochastic, meaning that for any given level
of seniority of the cross-holdings of debt each firm must also hold external liabilities with the same
seniority. Following Eisenberg and Noe (2001) (see also Glasserman & Young, 2016), we make use of
the Knaster–Tarski fixed-point theorem instead, which requires valuation functions to be monotonic—
preventing a straightforward modeling of derivatives—and not necessarily continuous. As a conse-
quence, default costs and analogous mechanisms can be easily accommodated in our framework (see
Section 4). Through the Knaster–Tarski fixed-point theorem, we prove not only the existence of a solu-
tion but also the existence of a greatest and a least solution. Remarkably, Theorem 3.2 shows that the
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greatest solution is attained if the starting point of the valuation is the book value of claims, providing
a clear prescription to perform the valuation even when multiple solutions exist.
From a practical perspective, it may be relevant to understand when an algorithm can terminate
in a finite number of iterations. Such results are normally proved ad hoc for a given model, meaning
that they make assumptions on the explicit functional form of the valuation function (Hain & Fis-
cher, 2015). In contrast, here we show that such result holds for a specific topology of the network
of interbank liabilities, namely a DAG (directed acyclic graph), regardless of the functional form of
the interbank valuation functions. A concrete application for which this result is especially relevant
is the compression of exposures (D’Errico & Roukny, 2018). In fact, although perfect compression is
rarely achieved in practice, techniques for compressing exposures would ideally convert any interbank
network into a DAG.
Proposition 3.4 (DAG). If the matrix defined by interbank assets 𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝑡) is the adjacency matrix of a
DAG and 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑡)) = 1, ∀𝑖:
1. the map (9) converges in a finite number of iterations,
2. the solution of (8) is unique.
4 RELATION WITH EXISTING CONTAGION MODELS
We now highlight the generality of the framework outlined in Section 2 by presenting a few relevant
examples. More specifically, we show that four different models well known in the literature can be
recovered as particular cases. In the following, we denote with 𝟙𝑥>0 the indicator function relative to
the set defined by the condition 𝑥 > 0 and we denote with (𝑥)+ the positive part of 𝑥, that is (𝑥)+ =
(𝑥 + |𝑥|)∕2.
Proposition 4.1 (Eisenberg and Noe). If 𝑡 = 𝑇 and:
1. 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑇 )) = 1, ∀𝑖,
2. 𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑇 )) = 𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑇 )≥0 +
(










𝑖 𝐿𝑗𝑖(𝑇 ), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of (8)
and the solutions of the map Φ introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001).




𝑖 𝐿𝑗𝑖(𝑇 )) of bank 𝑗’s total payments, meaning that external and interbank liabilities have the same
seniority. From (A.2b), we can see that the equity is what is left after both external and interbank
liabilities have been paid, and it is therefore less senior than both of them.
Proposition 4.2 (Rogers and Veraart). If 𝑡 = 𝑇 and
1. 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑇 )) = 1, ∀𝑖,



















𝑖 𝐿𝑗𝑖(𝑇 ), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of (8)
and the solutions of the map Φ introduced in Rogers and Veraart (2013).
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F I G U R E 1 Interbank valuation functions as a function of the equity of the borrower. Parameters as follows. EN:
?̄? = 2, Furfine: 𝑅 = 1, Linear DebtRank: 𝑀 = 2.5, ex ante EN: 𝐴𝑒 = 1, ?̄? = 2, 𝜎 = 1 [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Let us note that, unless 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1, 𝕍𝑖𝑗 is not a continuous function. When a bank defaults, there are
two contributions to the payments to its counterparties. First, its external assets discounted by a factor
𝛼 − 𝛽. Second, its total assets (𝐸𝑖(𝐩
∗(𝑇 )) + ?̄?𝑖(𝑇 ))
+ discounted by a factor 𝛽. Given that total assets
are the sum of interbank and external assets, putting the two terms together amounts to discounting
external assets by a factor 𝛼 and interbank assets by a factor 𝛽. This means that, when a bank defaults, its
external (interbank) assets will suddenly experience a relative loss of 𝛼 − 1 (𝛽 − 1), due to the necessity
to liquidate them in a fire sale.
Proposition 4.3 (Furfine). If
1. 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑡)) = 1, ∀𝑖,
2. 𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)) = 𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑡)≥0 + 𝑅𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑡)<0, ∀𝑖, 𝑗,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of (8) and the solutions of the map Φ
introduced in Furfine (2003).
Proposition 4.4 (Linear DebtRank). If
1. 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑡)) = 1, ∀𝑖,









there is a one-to-one correspondence between the greatest solution of (8) and the solution of the recur-
sive map (linear version of DebtRank) introduced in Bardoscia et al. (2015).
In Figure 1, we plot several interbank valuation functions: EN (see Proposition 4.1), Furfine (see
Proposition 4.3), Linear DebtRank (see Proposition 4.4), and ex ante EN, which will be introduced in
Section 5.
5 FROM CLEARING TO EX ANTE VALUATION
On the one hand, as already remarked, clearing models allow to compute the payments that banks
have to make to their counterparties at maturity. On the other hand, the valuation of corporate debt
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before maturity done by means of standard credit structural models allows each creditor only to account
for their direct debtors, ignoring the indirect effect that the debtors of their debtors might have when
creditors and debtors form a complex interconnected network. The aim of this section is to illustrate
how the framework introduced in Section 2 can be used to bridge this gap.
In a nutshell, we take a clearing model and we show that computing expected values over the ex ante
uncertainty yields a proper ex ante valuation model, in the sense specified in Section 2. Here we use
the EN model as the starting clearing model, but in principle a different clearing model could be used
as well. As anticipated in Section 2, external assets follow stochastic processes, and therefore banks
face an ex ante uncertainty on their value at maturity. For simplicity and to make the notation clearer,
we will also assume that the risk-free rate is constant and equal to zero.
The starting point is to perform a valuation of equities at time 𝑡 < 𝑇 as in any other credit structural
model, that is by taking the expected value of equities at 𝑇 over the unique martingale measure (EMM)8
ℚ, conditional on the filtration at time 𝑡:
𝐄(𝑡) = 𝔼ℚ[𝐄(𝑇 )| (𝑡)]. (10)
One possible method to compute the expected value on the right-hand side of (10) is to perform a
Monte Carlo simulation. This is the approach proposed in Fischer (2014), and a variation of it has been
used in Elsinger et al. (2006a, 2006b). This requires (i) to simulate a large number of trajectories of the
stochastic processes associated with external assets up to maturity, (ii) for each simulated trajectory, to
compute the solution of clearing equations with the simulated values of external assets at maturity, and
(iii) to approximate the expected value with the sample average of the equities that solve the clearing
equations. However, the possibility of performing those steps relies on the implicit assumption that
there is one agent who has complete knowledge of interbank assets. The reason is that the solution of
the clearing equations must be computed for a large number of potential realizations of external assets at
maturity, which are unknown to individual banks at time 𝑡. Indeed, an agent with complete information
is able to simulate the values of external assets at maturity and, because she has full knowledge of
interbank assets, is also able to solve all the corresponding clearing equations. In contrast, as explained
in Section 2, in our approach every bank has knowledge only of their own interbank assets.











(𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ))| (𝑡)] −
𝑛∑
𝑗=1
𝔼ℚ[𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑇 )| (𝑡)]. (11)
Because liabilities are nonstochastic, we have that 𝔼ℚ[𝐿
𝑒
𝑖
(𝑇 )| (𝑡)] = 𝐿𝑒
𝑖
(𝑇 ) and that
𝔼ℚ[𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑇 )| (𝑡)] = 𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑇 ). As the risk-free rate is equal to zero, book values of liabilities do
not need to be discounted at time 𝑡, meaning that 𝐿𝑒
𝑖
(𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝑒
𝑖
(𝑡) and that 𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑡). Both
considerations also apply to interbank assets, implying that 𝔼ℚ[𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝑇 )𝕍
(EN)
𝑖𝑗








(𝑇 )| (𝑡)] = 𝐴𝑒
𝑖
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We are now left with the task of computing the third term on the right-hand side of (12), that is the




















Bank 𝑖 has to compute the expected value in (13) at time 𝑡, when the valuation is performed. In general,
we note that bank 𝑗 might have debtors itself. This means that, for a fixed realization of the stochastic
processes on external assets, 𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ) might depend on the values of 𝑗’s interbank assets, which are
not known to 𝑖. Furthermore, 𝑗’s debtors might have debtors themselves (and so on), implying that
𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ) might in principle depend on all interbank assets. As a consequence, bank 𝑖 will necessarily
need to make an approximation when computing the expected value in (13). Here we assume that
banks, because they have no knowledge of the debtors of their debtors, attribute the variation in the
equities of their debtors to the variation in their external assets, that is 𝐄(𝑇 ) ≈ 𝐄(𝑡) + 𝐀𝑒(𝑇 ) − 𝐀𝑒(𝑡).
This means that the expected value in (13) becomes the expected value over the distributions of𝐴𝑗(𝑇 ),
the external assets at maturity, conditional on 𝐴𝑒
𝑗
(𝑡) the (observed) external assets at time 𝑡. Moreover,
after the expected value has been computed, the right-hand side of (13) will be an explicit function of
𝐸𝑗(𝑡). Hence, (12) will have the same structure of (5), that is provided that 𝔼ℚ[𝕍
(EN)
𝑖𝑗
(𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ))| (𝑡)] are
feasible valuation functions, we will have an ex ante valuation model. As such, all results in Section 3
will apply. Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 will ensure that there exists a greatest solution (therefore optimal for
all banks) and that such solution can be computed with arbitrary precision using the Picard iteration
algorithm (9). Indeed, the right-hand side of (13) is the expected value of a valuation function, which
takes values between zero and one, and therefore it will also be between zero and one. Similarly, the




(𝑇 ) − 𝐴𝑒
𝑗
(𝑡), it is also the expected value of a nondecreasing function of 𝐸𝑗(𝑡). Hence, the
right-hand side of (13) will itself be a nondecreasing function of𝐸𝑗(𝑡). The continuity properties will in




(𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ))| (𝑡)] is a valuation function will be discussed shortly.
Before we perform the explicit calculation of such valuation functions, a few observations are in
order. We stress that the approximation does not imply that 𝑗’s debtors (or other banks) do not have
any impact on 𝑖. In fact, the impact of 𝑗’s debtors is accounted for in the equation for 𝐸𝑗(𝑡), which
will feed into the equation for 𝐸𝑖(𝑡) when the fixed point of (13) is computed. In practice, when (13)
is solved iteratively, the first step of the algorithm will incorporate the effect of direct debtors into
equities. The second step will incorporate the effect of debtors of debtors, and so on.
Yet another way to interpret the approximation is to imagine that banks’ valuations of interbank
assets are individually risk neutral. In fact, if 𝐴𝑖𝑗 were the only non-zero interbank asset, the approx-
imation would be exact because 𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ) would depend only on 𝐴
𝑒
𝑗
(𝑇 ). In this sense, bank 𝑖 would be
computing the risk-neutral value of interbank assets, as if no other credit contract existed.
By defining Δ𝐀𝑒 ≡ 𝐀𝑒(𝑇 ) − 𝐀𝑒(𝑡) and by introducing the following shorthands:
𝑝𝐷
𝑗




















































(𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ))| (𝑡)] ≃ 1 − 𝑝𝐷𝑗 (𝐸𝑗(𝑡)) + 𝜌𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)). (15)
From the second line of (14a), we can see that 𝑝𝐷
𝑗
(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)) is, by definition, the probability that bank 𝑗
defaults at maturity. Analogously, from (14b) we can see that 𝜌𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)) is an endogenous recovery rate.
In fact, when𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ) < 0,𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ) + ?̄?𝑗(𝑇 ) is equal to 𝑗’s total assets, which are smaller than its liabilities.
Hence, 𝜌𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)) is equal to the (conditional) expected value of 𝑗’s assets at maturity when 𝑗 defaults
divided by its total liabilities, that is the (conditional) expected value of the fraction of interbank assets
that a creditor can expect to recover. From (15), we can see that the valuation function can be thought
of as the expectation over a two-valued probability distribution: if the debtor 𝑗 does not default at
maturity, 𝑖 will recover its interbank asset in full, while if 𝑗 defaults, 𝑖 will recover the endogenous
recovery rate. Thus, (15) can be interpreted as a generalization to endogenous recovery rates of the
valuation mechanisms in Bardoscia et al. (2016) (see (7) therein) and in Bardoscia et al. (2017) (see
(2) in Supplementary Methods), in which the recovery rate is exogenous.
Finally, as we approach maturity, the valuation functions in (15) approach the EN valuation functions
in Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 5.1. In the limit in which the maturity is approached, that is 𝑡 → 𝑇 , the interbank valuation
function (15) converges to the interbank valuation function of EN (Proposition 4.1).
5.1 Ex ante valuation with geometric Brownian motion
We now explicitly compute the probability of default and the endogenous recovery rate in (14) assum-









(𝑠)d𝑊𝑖(𝑠) ∀𝑠 ∈ [𝑡, 𝑇 ], 𝑖. (16)
The probability density function of Δ𝐴𝑒
𝑖
























































































































(𝑇 − 𝑡)∕2 + log
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(𝑇 − 𝑡)∕2 − log
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By plugging (18) into (15), it is easy to show that 𝔼ℚ[𝕍
(EN)
𝑖𝑗
(𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ))| (𝑡)] is actually a continuous
function of 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) (both from above and from below), and therefore a feasible valuation function.
5.2 Stress testing: Merton versus network valuation
As a proof of concept, here we carry out a stress test on a small financial system composed by three


























so that all three banks have a book value of their equity equal to one. Total leverages, defined as the
ratio between total assets and book values of equity, range from 10.8 to 2.3. Our stress test consists
of applying an exogenous shock to the external assets of all banks, resulting in a devaluation, in rel-
ative terms, by a factor 𝛼, that is 𝐴𝑒
𝑖
(𝑡) → (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑒
𝑖
(𝑡). The variation in external assets of bank 𝑖,
measured as the difference between its external assets before the shock and its external assets after




(𝑡). Using (5), we can readily compute the corresponding variation in equity,
again measured as the difference between the equity before the shock (i.e., its book value) and the





𝑗 𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝑡)[1 − 𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐸
∗
𝑗
(𝑡))]. The network contribution can be
quantified as the total losses in the system minus the losses directly caused by the exogenous shock:∑





𝑖𝑗 𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝑡)[1 − 𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐸
∗
𝑗
(𝑡))], which can be conveniently normalized by its maximum,∑
𝑖𝑗 𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝑡):
∑
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F I G U R E 2 Stress test consisting in applying an exogenous shock to external assets of all banks and by
reevaluating interbank claims. Left panel: network contribution (measured as the relative loss due to the revaluation of
interbank assets) as a function of the exogenous shock, for several valuation functions. Right panel: for each of the three
banks in the example network, the difference is shown between the discount factor relative to the valuation of their
interbank claim performed with the standard Merton approach and the discount factor relative to the valuation of their
interbank claim performed with ex ante EN [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
In the left panel of Figure 2, we show the behavior of the quantity (20) as a function of the exogenous
shock of magnitude 𝛼 on external assets, for several valuation functions. For Furfine, we take the
exogenous recovery rate𝑅 = 0, while for ex ante EN we take (16) with external assets volatility 𝜎𝑖(𝑇 −
𝑡) = 0.5, for all banks. Interestingly, we can see that the network contribution for ex ante EN is always
larger than for EN. We point out that this behavior is not in contrast with the behavior shown in Figure 1,
where the EN interbank valuation function becomes smaller than the ex ante EN interbank valuation
function for sufficiently small values of equities (which correspond to sufficiently large shocks). In fact,
in Figure 1 the ex ante EN interbank valuation function is computed for fixed external assets 𝐀𝑒(𝑡). In
contrast, in Figure 2 the ex ante EN interbank valuation functions are computed at the postshock values
of external assets 𝐀𝑒(𝑡), which obviously vary with the exogenous shock to external assets.
Another way to assess the extent of the network contribution is the following. Let us imagine that
each bank wants to valuate the interbank assets of its counterparty using the standard Merton approach.
This amounts to using the valuation function (15) and evaluating it in the book value of the equity of
the counterparty. Hence, the lender 𝑖 discounts its interbank assets 𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝑡) towards the borrower 𝑗 by




(𝑡)). In the right panel of Figure 2 we show the difference between such discount factors,
that is between the discount factor of the valuation of an interbank claim performed with the stan-
dard Merton approach and the valuation of an interbank claim performed with ex ante EN valua-
tion functions (16) with 𝜎𝑖(𝑇 − 𝑡) = 0.5, for all banks. In this example, from the right panel of Fig-
ure 2, we can see that for bank C, which holds a claim towards bank A, such difference can be larger
than 60% (when 𝛼 = 1). Since the book value of the interbank asset held by bank 𝐶 is equal to 0.8,
by using the Merton model, we would overestimate its value, in absolute terms, by 0.8 ⋅ 0.6 ≈ 0.5,
which is about 50% of the book value of bank 𝐶’s equity (which is equal to one in this exam-
ple). Furthermore, the larger the shock to external assets, the larger the difference between the two
discount factors.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduce a general framework to perform an ex ante and network-adjusted valuation of
financial institutions’ interbank claims. On the one hand, our framework encompasses some of the most
widely used models of financial contagion (Bardoscia et al., 2015; Eisenberg & Noe, 2001; Furfine,
2003; Rogers & Veraart, 2013), in the precise sense that the model is equivalent to those models for
specific choices of the valuation functions and the parameters. On the other hand, our framework relates
also to the stream of literature (Fischer, 2014; Suzuki, 2002) carrying out the valuation of claims à la
Merton when cross-holdings of debt exist between different firms.
Our main result is that, under mild assumptions about valuation functions, the valuation problem
admits a greatest solution, that is a solution in which the equities of all banks are maximal. Moreover,
we provide a simple iterative algorithm to compute such solution. Finally, we show how an ex ante
valuation model can be derived from a clearing model, that is from a model in which the valuation is
performed at maturity.
A natural application of our framework is in devising stress tests to assess losses on banks’ port-
folios in a network of liabilities, conditional to shocks on their external assets in order to determine
capital requirements and value at risk. Indeed, to any given shock on the external assets of the banks
it corresponds a different valuation of banks’ equities. Therefore, by assuming a known distribution
of shocks, one can derive a corresponding distribution of equity losses. Such distribution can then be
taken as the input of any axiomatic risk measure. Finally, one could embed our framework into a full-
fledged economy with nonfinancial firms, households, and a government. Indeed, Gray et al. (2010)
build an extension of the Merton model that, while abstracting from the network of individual firms,
focuses on interconnections between sectorial balance sheets, thereby allowing to discuss the main
transmission channels between them.
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ENDNOTES
1 The term uncertainty is used here in its generic sense of lack of certainty over future values, regardless of whether the
probability distribution of such values is known or not.
2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision states that “roughly two-thirds of losses attributed to counterparty credit
risk were due to Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) losses and only about one-third were due to actual defaults”; see
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011).
3 However, we stress that, since our valuations emerge as solution of a system of fixed-point equations, defaulting insti-
tutions do not default in a specific sequence, but default all at the same time. As a consequence, our approach is not
well-suited to capture bilateral CVA (Brigo & Capponi, 2010; Gregory, 2009), which also accounts for the sequence in
which defaults might occur.
4 Therefore, with a slight abuse of notation we denote with 𝐴𝑒
𝑖
(𝑡) the realization at 𝑡 of the stochastic process of external
assets of bank 𝑖, while for 𝑠 > 𝑡 we denote with 𝐴𝑒
𝑖
(𝑠) the random variable corresponding to external assets of bank 𝑖 at
time 𝑠.
5 The total book value of interbank assets of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is equal to
∑
𝑗 𝐴𝑖𝑗 (𝑡), while total book value of interbank
liabilities is equal to
∑
𝑗 𝐿𝑖𝑗 (𝑡).
6 Such notion of nonspeculative contracts is similar to the ones introduced in Schuldenzucker, Seuken, and Battiston
(2019) and further extended in Banerjee and Feinstein (2019).
7 Nevertheless, in Schuldenzucker et al. (2019) it is shown that in the presence of credit-default swaps there can be
multiple solutions or no solution at all.
8 The existence of a unique EMM descends from assuming no arbitrage opportunities and a complete market. Those
are standard assumptions in credit structural models. To the extent that one identifies expectations over the unique
EMM with market values, one can say that market values computed in this way incorporate the information about the
likelihood that counterparties default between 𝑡 and 𝑇 . We also note that in our framework equities are the difference
between assets 𝐴 and liabilities 𝐿 and can therefore be negative. On the other hand, market prices of equities should
take into account the limited liability of equity holders, who cannot go into negative equity. However, at maturity the
market price of the difference between assets and liabilities can be obtained by summing the market prices of equities
max(𝐴 − 𝐿, 0) to the market price of debt min(𝐿,𝐴) and by subtracting the book value of liabilities 𝐿. The argument
is valid also before maturity, simply by taking the conditional expectations of equity and debt prices over the risk-
neutral measure.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF THEOREMS AND PROPOSITIONS
For the sake of readability, in the proofs we suppress the explicit dependence on 𝑡 whenever there is
no risk of ambiguity.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of greatest and least solution). If all valuations functions in the map Φ take
values in [0,1] and are nondecreasing, the set of equations (8) admits a greatest solution 𝐄max(𝑡) and
a least solution 𝐄min(𝑡).
Proof. To prove it we just need to show that (a) the function Φ maps a complete lattice into itself,
Φ ∶ Λ → Λ, (b) the function Φ is an order-preserving function. To prove (a) we notice that if valuation
functions are feasible then


















and consequently Λ =
𝑛
𝑖=1
[𝑚𝑖,𝑀𝑖] is a complete lattice such that Φ ∶ Λ → Λ, that proves (a). Since
Φ is a linear combination of monotonic nondecreasing functions in 𝐄, then ∀𝐄,𝐄′ if 𝐄 ≤ 𝐄′, follows
Φ(𝐄) ≤ Φ(𝐄′), where the partial ordering relation in Λ is componentwise, that is 𝐱 ≤ 𝐲 iff ∀𝑖 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑖.
So both conditions (a) and (b) hold and the Knaster–Tarski theorem applies. The set of solutions 𝑆 of
(8) is then a complete lattice; therefore, it is nonempty (the empty set cannot contain its own supremum)
and, more importantly, it admits a supremum solution, 𝐄max, and an infimum solution, 𝐄min, such that
∀𝐄∗ ∈ 𝑆, 𝐄min ≤ 𝐄∗ ≤ 𝐄max. □
Theorem 3.2 (Convergence to the greatest solution). If all valuation functions in the mapΦ are feasible
and if 𝐄(0)(𝑡) = 𝐌(𝑡), then
1. the sequence {𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡)} is monotonic nonincreasing: ∀𝑘 ≥ 0, 𝐄(𝑘+1)(𝑡) ≤ 𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡),
2. the sequence {𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡)} is convergent: lim𝑘→∞ 𝐄
(𝑘)(𝑡) = 𝐄∞(𝑡),
3. 𝐄∞(𝑡) is a solution of (8) and furthermore 𝐄∞(𝑡) = 𝐄max(𝑡).
Proof. Convergence will be proved by induction. For 𝑛 = 0, we have
𝐄(1) = Φ(𝐄(0)) ≤ 𝐌 = 𝐄(0).
Assume now that the claim is true for all 0 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛, then
𝐄(𝑛+1) = Φ(𝐄(𝑛)) ≤ Φ(𝐄(𝑛−1)) = 𝐄(𝑛),
where we have used the fact that Φ is monotonic nondecreasing and 𝐄(𝑛) ≤ 𝐄(𝑛−1) by hypothesis, We
know that {𝐄(𝑛)} is bounded below and monotonic nonincreasing, by the monotone convergence the-
orem we have that 𝐄∗ = lim𝑛→∞ 𝐄
(𝑛) = inf𝑛{𝐄
(𝑛)} exists and is finite. By hypothesis Φ is continuous









So that 𝐄∗ ∈ 𝑆. We will now prove it must be that 𝐄∗ = 𝐄max. First we need to establish a preliminary
result, namely that 𝐄(𝑛) ≥ 𝐄max,∀𝑛. Reasoning by induction, it is trivially true for the initial point that
𝐄(0) ≥ 𝐄max. Suppose now that it is true up to a given ?̄?, 𝐄(?̄?) ≥ 𝐄max then, since Φ is order-preserving,
𝐄(?̄?+1) = Φ(𝐄(?̄?)) ≥ Φ(𝐄max) = 𝐄max.
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Now, knowing that 𝐄(𝑛) ≥ 𝐄max,∀𝑛 we have that 𝐄∗ = inf𝑛{𝐄
(𝑛)} ≥ 𝐄max. But 𝐄∗ ∈ 𝑆, hence 𝐄∗ =
𝐄max. □
Theorem 3.3 (Convergence to the least solution). If all valuations functions in the map Φ take values
in [0,1], are nondecreasing, and continuous from below, and if 𝐄(0)(𝑡) = 𝐦(𝑡), then
1. the sequence {𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡)} is monotonic nondecreasing: ∀𝑘 ≥ 0, 𝐄(𝑘+1)(𝑡) ≥ 𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡),
2. the sequence {𝐄(𝑘)(𝑡)} is convergent: lim𝑘→∞ 𝐄
(𝑘)(𝑡) = 𝐄∞(𝑡),
3. 𝐄∞(𝑡) is a solution of (8) and furthermore 𝐄∞(𝑡) = 𝐄min(𝑡).
Proof. Convergence will be proved by induction. For 𝑛 = 0, we have
𝐄(1) = Φ(𝐄(0)) ≥ 𝐦 = 𝐄(0).
Assume now that the claim is true for all 0 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛, then
𝐄(𝑛+1) = Φ(𝐄(𝑛)) ≥ Φ(𝐄(𝑛−1)) = 𝐄(𝑛),
where we have used the fact that Φ is monotonic nondecreasing and 𝐄(𝑛) ≥ 𝐄(𝑛−1) by hypothesis. We
know that {𝐄(𝑛)} is bounded above and monotonic nondecreasing, by the monotone convergence theo-
rem we have that 𝐄∗ = lim𝑛 𝐄
(𝑛) = sup𝑛{𝐄









So that 𝐄∗ ∈ 𝑆. We will now prove it must be that 𝐄∗ = 𝐄min. First we need to establish a preliminary
result, namely that 𝐄(𝑛) ≤ 𝐄min,∀𝑛. Reasoning by induction, it is trivially true for the initial point that
𝐄(0) ≤ 𝐄min. Suppose now that it is true up to a given ?̄?, 𝐄(?̄?) ≤ 𝐄min then, since Φ is order-preserving,
𝐄(?̄?+1) = Φ(𝐄(?̄?)) ≤ Φ(𝐄min) = 𝐄min.
Now, knowing that 𝐄(𝑛) ≤ 𝐄min,∀𝑛 we have that 𝐄∗ = sup𝑛{𝐄
(𝑛)} ≤ 𝐄min. But 𝐄∗ ∈ 𝑆, hence 𝐄∗ =
𝐄min. □
Proposition 3.4 (DAG). If the matrix defined by interbank assets 𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝑡) is the adjacency matrix of a
DAG and 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑡)) = 1, ∀𝑖:
1. the map (9) converges in a finite number of iterations,
2. the solution of (8) is unique.
Proof. We define source banks as those banks that do not hold interbank assets, that is𝑆0 = {𝑖 ∶ 𝐴𝑖𝑗 =
0,∀𝑗}, which is a nonempty set if the matrix of interbank exposures is a DAG. We then partition banks




Starting from the initial condition 𝐌, banks in 𝑆0 converge in zero iterations to their book value as
their equity does not depend on the equity of any other bank (neither their own). Banks in 𝑆1 converge
in one iteration as their equity only depends on the equities of banks in𝑆0. By induction, banks in𝑆𝑑max
converge in 𝑑max iterations. Starting from the initial condition 𝐦 banks in 𝑆0 converge in one iteration
to their book value as the Picard iteration algorithm corrects the value of their equities exactly in one
iteration. Consequently, Φ(𝑑max)(𝐌) = Φ(𝑑max+1)(𝐦), and therefore all banks converge to 𝐄min = 𝐄max
in (at most) 𝑑max + 1 iterations. □
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Proposition 4.1 (Eisenberg and Noe). If 𝑡 = 𝑇 and
1. 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑇 )) = 1, ∀𝑖,
2. 𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑇 )) = 𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑇 )≥0 + (
𝐸𝑗 (𝑇 )+?̄?𝑗 (𝑇 )
?̄?𝑗 (𝑇 )
)+𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑇 )<0, ∀𝑖, 𝑗





𝑖 𝐿𝑗𝑖(𝑇 ), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of (8)
and the solutions of the map Φ introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
Proof. As already noted, in EN the valuation happens at maturity, 𝑡 = 𝑇 . Under the assumptions of (i)
limited liabilities, (ii) priority of debt over equity, (iii) proportional repayments, EN aims at computing
a clearing payment vector 𝐩∗(𝑇 ) whose component 𝑝∗
𝑖
(𝑇 ) is the total payment made by bank 𝑖 to its
counterparties. To conform to their notation, we also introduce the obligation vector ?̄?(𝑇 ), defined as






















where 𝑒𝑖(𝑇 ) = 𝐴
𝑒
𝑖
(𝑇 ). Equation (A.1) can be equivalently rewritten as
𝑝∗
𝑖
(𝑇 ) = ?̄?𝑖(𝑇 )𝟙𝐸𝑖(𝐩∗(𝑇 ))≥0 +
[
𝐸𝑖(𝐩





𝐸𝑖(𝐩(𝑇 )) = 𝐴
𝑒
𝑖












The above equations are equivalent to (5) by choosing the valuation functions as in the hypotheses
of the Proposition 4.1. In fact, when 𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ) > 0, the cash inflow of bank 𝑗 is enough to cover its due
payments, and therefore ?̄?(𝑇 ) = 𝐩∗(𝑇 ). In contrast, when𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ) < 0, bank 𝑗 employs its residual assets
[𝐸𝑗(𝑇 ) + ?̄?𝑗(𝑇 )]
+ to repay its creditors proportionally as much as it can. □
Proposition 4.2 (Rogers and Veraart). If 𝑡 = 𝑇 and
1. 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑇 )) = 1, ∀𝑖,






𝐸𝑗 (𝑇 )+?̄?𝑗 (𝑇 )
?̄?𝑗 (𝑇 )
)+]𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑇 )<0, ∀𝑖, 𝑗





𝑖 𝐿𝑗𝑖(𝑇 ), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of (8)
and the solutions of the map Φ introduced in Rogers and Veraart (2013).
Proof. The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.1. Similarly to (A.2a), payments
as functions of equities are given by
𝑝∗
𝑖





(𝑇 ) + 𝛽
(
𝐸𝑖(𝐩





Proposition 4.3 (Furfine). If
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1. 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑡)) = 1, ∀𝑖,
2. 𝕍𝑖𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)) = 𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑡)≥0 + 𝑅𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑡)<0, ∀𝑖, 𝑗,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of (8) and the solutions of the map Φ
introduced in Furfine (2003).
Proof. According to the Furfine algorithm, a counterparty with nonnegative equity is always able to
fully repay its liabilities, while, if its equity is negative it will only repay a fraction 𝑅 of them. This is
exactly what the valuation function in Proposition 4.3 accounts for. □
Proposition 4.4 (Linear DebtRank). If:
1. 𝕍 𝑒
𝑖
(𝐸𝑖(𝑡)) = 1, ∀𝑖,









there is a one-to-one correspondence between the greatest solution of (8) and the solution of the recur-
sive map (linear version of DebtRank) introduced in Bardoscia et al. (2015).
Proof. The easiest way to prove the correspondence is to start from 𝐌(𝑡) and to compute the

















, for all 𝑖. Starting the Picard iteration algorithm from 𝐌(𝑡), we recover
(7) in Bardoscia et al. (2015), in which 𝐌(𝑡) has been denoted with 𝐄(0). As soon as the equity of bank
𝑗 becomes equal to zero in the iterative map in Bardoscia et al. (2015), it will not change anymore,
which is consistent with the incremental variation derived above. □
Proposition 5.1. In the limit in which the maturity is approached, that is 𝑡 → 𝑇 , the interbank valuation
function (15) converges to the interbank valuation function of EN (Proposition 4.1).
Proof. First we notice that, as 𝑡 → 𝑇 the variation in external assets goes to zero with probability
approaching one, and therefore from (14) we have that 𝑝𝐷
𝑗
(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)) → 𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑇 )<0 and that 𝜌𝑗(𝐸𝑗(𝑡)) →
(
𝐸𝑗 (𝑇 )+?̄?𝑗 (𝑇 )
?̄?𝑗 (𝑇 )
)+𝟙𝐸𝑗 (𝑇 )<0, from which the proposition easily follows. □
